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ESTIMATION OF A FISCAL POLICY RULE FOR 
EMU COUNTRIES (1984-2005)
Abstract
The primary objective of this paper is to estimate a fiscal policy rule for 
each of the EMU member States from 1984 to 2005 in order to know if there has 
been a systematic response of the cyclically adjusted primary balance to output 
gap and debt level variations. Also, we aim to discover whether the change in the 
fiscal framework which took place after 1992 has had a substantial impact on the 
fiscal policy applied. The principal novelty is that the estimation is performed 
simultaneously by means of a SURE (Seemingly Unrelated Regression Estimator) 
model. We are thus able to obtain different coefficients for each country, while 
developing possible correlations between national fiscal policies which would 
reveal the existence of common factors. The results provide clear evidence of a 
structural break in the rule after the introduction of the new fiscal regulations and, 
as the hypothesis of equality in the national coefficients of the rule is clearly 
rejected, reveal a need to consider specific national factors. 
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1. Introduction:
The primary objective of this paper is to estimate a policy rule for the 
fiscal authorities of each of the EMU member States from 1984 to 2005 in order 
to know if there has been a systematic response of the cyclically adjusted primary 
balance to output gap and debt level variations. 
The overall approach, therefore, lies within the framework of what is 
known as New Normative Macroeconomics (Taylor (2000a and 2000b)), the 
principal characteristic of which is the formulation of economic policy in the form 
of activist rules. These rules are expressed by more or less simple equations in 
which the instrument used by the authorities depends on a reduced number of 
variables indicating the state of the economy. 
The use of policy rules has spread in academic literature as a useful tool 
for analysing economic policy from both a positive and normative perspective 
The best known example is the Taylor Rule1. The estimation of the Taylor Rule 
enables us to know if a central bank actively responds or not to changes in the 
inflation rate or income, and make comparisons between countries over time. 
One paper of reference in the application of this method to fiscal policy in 
EMU countries is Galí and Perotti (2003). Their primary objective was to analyse 
the changes occurred in European fiscal policy as a result of the introduction of 
new fiscal rules in 1992 (Maastricht Treaty, MT) and 1997 (Stability and Growth 
Pact, SGP). In particular, from our perspective, the most important results 
obtained from estimating the rule are that the new fiscal policy framework have 
reduced the previously procyclical nature of the discretionary policies applied by 
 
1 Taylor (1993). 
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European governments, and that nonetheless, there has been no reduction in the 
application of corrective fiscal policies when public debt has increased. 
Although a different rule is also estimated for each country separately, 
Galí and Perotti focus on common European trends, and obtain their main results 
from estimating a data panel in which the coefficients of the rule are the same for 
all EMU countries. Consequently, they are unable to appropriately distinguish the 
different fiscal policies applied by each European country. 
This “common European factor”, and in particular the introduction of new 
fiscal rules, has probably been of great importance for the development of the 
fiscal policies applied by the different governments. However, we cannot rule out 
the existence of “specific national factors” which have generated significant 
differences in the coefficients of the rule for each country. We have therefore 
simultaneously estimated all the national equations with a SURE2 model, enabling 
us to use the information derived from both common and specific factors.
Indeed, the simultaneous estimation of all the equations makes use of the 
correlation between the errors terms of each national equation, including all 
factors with a common origin. But, at the same time, there is no initial constraint 
to the value of the national coefficients, which are not necessarily the same, 
enabling us to consider national differences. In fact, the results obtained clearly 
show that such differences are significant. 
This paper is therefore supplementary to the work of  Galí y Perotti, and its 
primary objective is to re-estimate the impact of the change in the European fiscal 
policy framework on the discretionary policies applied by European governments 
 
2 Seemingly Unrelated Regression Estimator. 
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while paying more attention to the differences between countries. In the second 
section, then, we define the fiscal policy rule to be estimated while, in the third, 
we justify the choice of method and approach some issues related to the data 
employed. The fourth section includes a brief summary of the coefficients 
estimation, together with the principal tests used to diagnose the model. Section 
five contains a more detailed interpretation of the results and the paper ends with 
our conclusions. 
 
2. Identification of the fiscal policy rule:
In this section, we present the fiscal policy to be estimated, requiring us to 
define both the variable to be used to represent the authorities’ decisions and the 
variables whose evolution in turn determined fiscal policy changes. For 
comparison purposes, these variables are as used by Galí and Perotti (2003). 
 
2.1. Variable representing fiscal policy:
The variable used in this paper to represent fiscal policy orientation is the 
cyclically adjusted primary balance (CAPB), the dependent variable of the 
regression. This variable represents the discretionary component of fiscal policy, 
that is, the part of the budgetary balance which directly depends on governmental 
decisions. In particular: 
• We use the primary and not the total balance because the authorities have no 
short term impact on debt interest payments, since they depend on the 
evolution of the interest rate and accumulated debt. Furthermore, as Bohn 
(1998) shows, a condition sufficient to ensure the long-term sustainability of 
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public finance is that the authorities increase the primary balance whenever 
the public debt-GDP ratio grows. One of our objectives is precisely to 
determine the degree to which the authorities take sufficient action to ensure 
this.  
• We have also discounted the effects of the economic cycle from this primary 
balance, for two reasons. Firstly, the CAPB (or its increase) is the variable 
most often used in fiscal policy literature to measure the orientation 
(expansive or contractive) of discretionary fiscal policy, distinguishing it from 
the effect of automatic stabilisers which would be mixed into the total primary 
balance3. Secondly, as Galí and Perotti (2003) point out, given the more 
structural nature of the factors influencing the action of automatic stabilisers 
(for instance, the labour market or welfare state institutions of each country) 
are unlikely to have been significantly affected in the short tem by the 
Maastricht Treaty or the Stability and Growth Pact. Therefore, since another 
of our objectives is precisely to analyse the effect of introducing these rules 
into the behaviour of fiscal authorities, the CAPB appears to be a more 
appropriate variable. 
 
2.2. Variables determining fiscal policy:
The variables used as regressors in this paper are the output gap, the debt-GDP 
ratio, a binary variable and the cyclically adjusted balance delayed one period:
• The choice of these variables is related to the objectives expected of the 
authorities when making their budgetary decisions. According to Favero and 
 
3 This analytical procedure is followed by the European Commission (2006) and in all the previous 
editions of Public Finances in EMU. Larch and Salto (2003) offer a discussion of the utility of this 
indicator to measure the sign of discretionary fiscal policy. 
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6
Monacelli (2003), these decisions largely obey a short-term objective (the 
cyclical stabilisation of the economy, which these authors qualify as the 
“active” component of fiscal policy) and another longer-term objective (the 
sustainability of public finance, or “passive" component of fiscal policy). 
From a short-term perspective, the authorities may attempt to alter 
public revenue and expenditure in order to compensate for cyclical income 
fluctuations by means of their effect on aggregate demand. Some doubts have 
recently been expressed concerning the efficacy of fiscal policy in influencing 
income and employment levels, fundamentally based on the hypothesis of 
Ricardian Equivalence. However, neither the theoretical arguments4 nor the 
empirical evidence appear to be sufficient to reject the use of fiscal policy to 
stabilise the economy. Indeed, numerous recent studies provide strong support 
for the idea that fiscal stimuli can have positive effects on the economy during 
periods of low growth5. In fact, the creation of the EMU itself, by centralising 
monetary policy decisions, is an additional argument for national authorities to 
operate in this way, further adapting the global sign of the single monetary 
policy to the specific cyclical conditions in each country. Therefore, one of the 
regression variables is the output gap (OG), to verify whether EMU countries 
 
4 Calmfors (2003) says that “the Ricardian equivalence results require very restrictive theoretical 
assumptions which are not likely to apply in reality”. Blinder (2004) summarises the most 
common criticisms of this hypothesis. 
5 Burnside, Eichenbaum and Fisher (1999) and Fatás and Mihov (2000) point out that in the United 
States fiscal shocks also produce changes in output, consumption, investment and employment. 
Furthermore, Fatás and Mihov (2002), based on time and cross-section data pertaining to 51 
countries, find that the relation between the magnitude of output changes and the use of 
discretionary fiscal policy is statistically significant, in the sense that countries with larger 
governments suffer less economic cycle volatility. On the other hand, Perotti (2002) studies the 
effects of fiscal measures on GDP, price and interest rate growth in five OECD countries (United 
States, Germany, United Kingdom, Canada and Australia) using autoregressive vectors. Firstly, 
the analysis reveals that the estimated effects of fiscal policy on the GDP tend to be positive, 
although minor, and that public expenditure multipliers (positive and mostly less than one) are 
usually larger in absolute values that those obtained as tax multipliers (negative). Hemming, Kell 
and Mahfouz (2002) present a selection of this empirical literature, showing that the estimated 
mean tax multiplier is 0.5. 
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7
have indeed worked in this way, systematically changing the CAPB to 
stabilise their economies. This would be confirmed by a positive regression 
coefficient. 
With a more long-term perspective, another of the objectives at which 
countries should aim when making primary balance decisions is, as we have 
mentioned, to guarantee the long-term sustainability of public finance. This 
requires corrective measures when debt increases, and the second regressor 
variable is therefore the debt/GDP ratio (PD) at the end of the previous period. 
This variable’s coefficient should also be positive if the authorities 
systematically apply policies which are sustainable in the long term. 
• A second criterion for the choice of variables included in the regression is 
derived from the fact that the framework in which fiscal policy is applied in 
the European Union has changed substantially since the nineties with the 
introduction of the rules established first in the Maastricht Treaty and, later, 
with the Stability and Growth Pact. This suggests the possibility of a structural 
break in the value of the parameters6 so, to account for this possible effect, we 
have included a binary variable (AM92it) with zero value for the years before 
1992 and a value of 1 from then on, accompanying both the output gap and 
public debt as the constant of the regression. 
• Finally, we have included the value of the CAPB delayed one period, in so far 
as fiscal decisions are affected by a high level of inertia. Indeed, the results of 
the estimation show that this variable is significant in the fiscal policy of all 
EMU countries. 
 
6 A Chow test and other statistics have confirmed us such a structural rupture in 1992. See section 
4.1. 
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2.3. Estimated equation and meaning of the coefficients:
In conclusion, once the independent and dependent variables have been 
defined, the estimated equation is as follows: 
 
ititiititiitiititiitiitiiit uCAPBPDAMPDOGAMOGAMCAPB +++++++=  1519241392219210  (1) 
 
As we will see later, this equation was estimated simultaneously for each of 
the 11 EMU countries for which data is available from 1984 (all of them except 
Luxembourg) taken from OECD (2006). An equation is also estimated for the 
mean EMU data. 
As we mentioned earlier, CAPB is the cyclically adjusted primary balance, 
OG is the output gap, PD represents public debt, AM is the variable representing 
the effect of the introduction of new fiscal rules in the EU from 1992 on, and 
Table 1 shows the economic meaning of the coefficients. Sub-index i represents 
the ith country, whereas sub-index t represents the period to which the variables 
correspond. 
Insert Table 1 here 
 
3. Method of estimation and data used:
One of the main issues we have approached in this paper is the choice of a 
method of estimation meeting two important conditions. 
In the first place, we are working with 11 countries which form part of a 
strongly integrated economic area, the fiscal policies of which have been 
conditioned by a highly significant institutional change, represented by the new 
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fiscal discipline rules included in the Maastricht Treaty and the Stability and 
Growth Pact. Their fiscal policies can therefore be expected to have some 
common features. 
Secondly, however, we are also interested in determining whether the 
systematic behaviour of the different national fiscal authorities – shown in the 
coefficients of the rule – reveals differences, and whether the effects of 
introducing the new fiscal framework have been homogeneous across EMU 
countries. This seems particularly important as, throughout the integration 
process, economic policy coordination did not include the centralisation of fiscal 
policies which, although subject to a multilateral supervision process, remain 
under the authority of the national governments. Furthermore, after the creation 
of the EMU, fiscal policy is now the only macroeconomic instrument available to 
these governments for stabilising their economies, so each country can be 
expected to adapt it to its own specific situation. 
In other words, the method of estimation has to contemplate the interrelation 
between fiscal policies, while distinguishing different national behaviours.
Taking the work of Galí and Perotti (2003) and IMF (2004) as representative 
of recent literature concerning the estimation of fiscal policy rules in EMU 
countries, we see that they have used a similar modelling strategy. Each national 
equation is first estimated separately, subsequently estimating a panel with data 
from all the countries, permitting the existence of fixed national effects but taking 
the other coefficients between the fiscal rules of different countries as equal. 
Galí and Perotti (2003) justify this second step by referring to a problem of 
insufficient degrees of freedom in the estimation of each national equation 
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separately, whereas IMF (2004) underlines the possibility of changes in the 
coefficients derived from processes common to the entire euro area, such as the 
introduction of a new fiscal framework. This global effect could be insufficiently 
contemplated in the individual national estimations. 
The principal innovation in our work is the use of a SURE (Seemingly 
Unrelated Regression Estimator) model7, which will enable simultaneous
estimation by generalised least squares of the 11 national equations considered. In 
our opinion, there are two primary reasons for preferring this choice to the 
alternative used in the two aforementioned publications: 
 
1. On the one hand, this estimation procedure enables the use of the correlation 
matrix of the error terms of each equation to gain efficiency. The growing 
interdependence of these economies, the convergence of their economic 
policies8 or the existence of common shocks will give the error terms of the 
equations of the different countries a common component, representing a far 
from negligible contemporaneous correlation9. It is therefore not efficient to 
estimate the 11 fiscal policy equations separately for each country.  
2. Furthermore, our model does not initially limit the behaviour of the different 
countries because they belong to the EMU, but tests the values of the 
coefficients to determine whether behaviour is homogeneous or varies among 
the different national authorities. In other words, it considers the possible 
importance of specific national factors (political, economic or institutional) 
 
7 See Green (1999), Chap. 15. 
8 European Commission (2004). 
9 The data used in the study are annual and, due to their low frequency, there are unlikely to be 
important non-contemporaneous correlations. The cross correlation functions calculated from the 
GLS residuals of the different countries have confirmed this. 
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for explaining the fiscal authorities’ different reactions to changes in the 
cyclic situation or levels of debt. Indeed, as we shall see later, the hypotheses 
of homogeneous behaviour by countries have always been rejected. 
 
This type of estimation, therefore, by enabling us to simultaneously obtain 
different coefficients for each country, is more efficient for distinguishing 
national behaviours than the fixed effects of the data panel.
Taking this into account, the estimation is by generalised least squares (GLS) 
to gain efficiency, contemplating the contemporaneous correlations between 
countries. To justify this, we start by specifying the covariance matrix of the 
enlarged vector formed with the error terms of all the simultaneous equations. A 
simple and realistic assumption concerning the structure of this covariance matrix 
comprises the following hypotheses10:
1. In each equation, the error term presents neither autocorrelation nor 
heteroscedasticity11:
( ) Tiii Iuu 2, 	=
 ; i = 1,2, ..., m12 
The fact that the lagged dependent variable itself appears as the regressor 
also shows that, with this assumption, the error term does not present 
correlation. 
2. The only non null correlation between the errors of the different equations 
is contemporaneous: 
 
10 Novales (1993), page 274. 
11 Although there can be heteroscedasticity between the different countries.  
12 m is the number of equations in the model. 
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( ) Tijii Iuu 	=
 , ; i J j; i,j = 1,2, …, m 
That is, it is assumed that the covariance is independent from the moment 
in time considered [E (uitu´jt) = Mij, for all t = 1,2, ..., T] and it is also 
admitted that E (uitu´js) = 0 for all t J s, t, s = 1, 2, ..., T.  
 
With the above assumptions, the general covariance matrix of the shocks 
can be written using the Kronecker product: =  tI , where  is the 
contemporaneous variance-covariance matrix of the residuals. Matrix  is not 
scalar and, therefore, if our assumptions are true, the usual ordinary least squares 
(OLS) estimator will not be efficient, since it ignores the information contained in 
the covariances between contemporaneous observations of different equations. 
The efficient estimation, considering the covariance matrix between the error 
terms of different equations, can be performed by generalised least squares (GLS) 
by means of the following expression: 
( ) ( )YXXX TTMCG 111ˆ  =
And the covariance matrix of the estimation is given by: 
( ) 11ˆvar = XX TMCG
Our analysis of the residuals of the estimated national equations has 
confirmed our assumptions about the covariance matrix and, therefore, the 
convenience of simultaneous estimation by GLS. 
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This is shown, for instance in the heteroscedasticity test between groups 
and cross-section correlation13 (Table 2). This tests the hypothesis that the 
elements outside the diagonal of the covariance matrix estimated from the OLS 
residuals are zero, that is, that there is no correlation between EMU countries. If 
the null hypothesis is rejected, as it is here, it is more efficient to estimate a SURE 
model by GLS, as the model is not restricted by a single parameter vector and the 
correlation matrix of the error terms is used in the estimation to gain efficiency. 
 
Insert Table 2 here 
 
Furthermore, the contemporaneous correlation matrix of the residuals 
estimated by GLS (Table 3) contains significant values, confirming the need to 
take these correlations into account when estimating the model. 
 
Insert Table 3 here 
 
Finally, Graph 1 shows the autocorrelation functions of the residuals 
estimated by GLS. As we can see, the error term of each equation does not 
present autocorrelation, which is one of the other assumptions established 
concerning the covariance matrix of the error terms. 
 
Insert Graph 1 here 
 
13 Green (1999), page. 571. 
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One final issue that has to be considered in relation to the method of 
estimation employed refers to the data available. We have used the annual data 
provided in the Statistical Annex of OECD Economic Outlook (No. 79, May 
2006), which includes both fiscal variables and the estimation of the output gap 
and the separation between the discretionary component of fiscal policy and the 
use of automatic stabilisers. 
The estimated period includes every year for which data is available for the 
11 countries for which the fiscal policy rule has been estimated: from 1984 to 
2005. This period is particularly interesting, because it includes enough years 
before and after the approval of the fiscal rules currently applicable in the EMU, 
enabling us to analyse a possible structural change. 
One problem with our method of estimation is that, since the sample is 
relatively short, the number of observations is small in relation to the number of 
parameters to be estimated. To reduce this possible over-parameterisation 
problem, it may be a good idea to increase the data frequency or increase the 
period backwards in time. We have ruled out both these options, however, for the 
following reasons: 
 
• In the first place, most of the tests we have used for diagnosing the model, 
analysing the fit of the estimation with the original series or testing the 
existence of a structural break, have rejected the null hypothesis 
considered. And, although the tests are not very powerful because of the 
short sample used, if the null hypothesis considered is rejected, as it is 
here, there will be very clear evidence in favour of this rejection. 
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• Although there are some quarterly fiscal data interpolated from annual 
figures, they are not homogeneous and, furthermore, budgetary decision-
making takes place on an annual basis. This, for instance, is the frequency 
with which the budgets of EMU countries are approved and compliance 
with the requirements of the Stability and Growth Pact is analysed. 
• We would also prefer not to go much further back than the contemplated 
period, as the seventies are characterised by important supply shocks 
(rising oil prices) which conditioned the application of economic policy. 
We would probably have to consider the special nature of the data 
pertaining to those years by including new parameters, which would 
certainly do nothing to improve the over-parameterisation problem 
observed with our model. Indeed, the empirical literature about the recent 
evolution of fiscal policy in the EMU compared with previous years 
usually focuses on the period starting in the eighties. 
• There is also an important practical reason. We have used all the data 
provided by the OECD Economic Outlook as Galí and Perotti (2003). The 
two options proposed could reduce our comparability and force us to use a 
different source. 
 
4. Estimated values of the coefficients and principal tests 
performed:
Table 4 shows the values of the estimated coefficients of the fiscal policy 
rule for each country and for the EMU overall, together with the t-statistic. 
Page 15 of 36
Editorial Office, Dept of Economics, Warwick University, Coventry CV4 7AL, UK
Submitted Manuscript
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
For Peer Review
16
Although we will later be analysing our results and their possible significance in 
more detail, we are now in a position to advance some results: 
 
• Before 1992, the coefficients estimated for the output gap are 10% 
significant in 5 of the 11 countries; after 1992, they are significantly 
different from zero in 6 countries. It is clearly significant in both periods 
for the EMU overall. 
• The only case in which the estimated coefficient is positive and 
significant both before and after 1992 is Finland,. In the rest, it is either 
negative or not significantly different from zero. This appears to 
indicate that, in the past, discretionary fiscal policy did not 
systematically play a stabilising role. 
• The estimated debt coefficients are significant for 5 EMU countries 
before 1992 and for 3 afterwards. For the EMU overall, its mean value 
is very close to zero in both periods. 
• Unlike the case of the output gap, when these coefficients are 
significant, they take on positive values, with the only exception of 
Belgium before Maastricht. 
• Finally, the coefficient of the cyclically-adjusted primary balance 
lagged one period is clearly significant for all the countries, showing 
that budgetary decisions are affected by a certain degree of inertia. 
 
Insert Table 4 here 
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Besides these tests of the individual significance of the parameters, below 
are the results of the principal statistical tests performed to analyse the evidence 
available concerning the existence of a structural change in the sample, in order to 
check whether the estimation obtained meets the required conditions. 
 
4.1. Evidence of structural change:
One of our primary objectives is to test whether the change occurred in the 
regulatory framework applicable to fiscal policy from 1992 on has altered the 
systematic behaviour of the fiscal authorities, both in their response to the output 
gap and in their reaction to changes in indebtedness, and whether this change has 
been heterogeneous in the different countries. 
In order to verify whether there is a structural break in the data in 1992 
and, therefore, whether the introduction of a binary variable14 with which to 
represent the effects of the Maastricht Treaty was correct, we have performed a 
series of tests on our model, the results of which are shown in Table 5. 
 
Insert Table 5 here 
 
The first row shows the result of the Chow test, which clearly detects a 
change in the value of the parameters from 1992 on, so we have estimated the 
model including a binary variable (AM92t) representing the effect of the change 
in the fiscal framework on the behaviour of each country’s authorities. 
 
14 With a value of one from 1992 on and zero beforehand. 
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This change can be included both in the equation’s constant and in the 
response of discretionary policy to the output gap and debt. The model including 
the structural change would be represented by the equation: 
ititiititiitiititiitiitiiit uCAPBPDAMPDOGAMOGAMCAPB +++++++=  1519241392219210 
We have also compared the estimation resulting from this model with that 
derived from the same model without structural change, using Akaike and 
Schwarz information criteria. As the Table shows, this analysis confirms that, 
although there is an over-parameterisation problem, the model with structural 
break fits the data better than a model estimated by the same procedure but 
without contemplating such a break. 
Thirdly, to measure the overall goodness of fit of the system, we present a 
McElroy generalised R2 (1977)15. The use of this statistic instead of the 
traditional R2 is justified, firstly, by the need for a single overall measurement of 
the system’s goodness of fit; and secondly, because in a SURE model like ours 
the cross-section correlation is used in the method of estimation to gain efficiency 
in the estimations obtained. The value of this measurement from the data used 
here is 0.925. 
On the fourth row of the Table, we go from a global analysis of the 
model’s fit to a more detailed analysis of each of the parameters showing the 
effects of the structural change in discretionary fiscal policy (1i, 2i and 4i). We 
have therefore tested whether 0: 10 =iH  or 0: 10 =iH  or 0: 40 =iH  , which 
 
15The McElroy R2 corresponds to the following expression (see Green (1999), page 585): 
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is more clearly rejected for the constant and the debt coefficient, but also for the 
output gap. 
There is therefore very strong evidence of a structural change. The second 
part of Table 5 shows other tests performed to verify whether there are significant 
national differences in the effects of this structural change.  
 Row 5 presents the results of a test to rule out the effect derived from the 
application of new fiscal rules from 1992 on being the same for all EMU 
countries, that is, whether 110 :  =iH or 220 :  =iH or 440 :  =iH . Once 
again, the null hypothesis is rejected, which seems to reinforce the need to 
estimate the model allowing for national differences in the parameters. 
And this result is even stronger when we test the equality of the 
parameters, both in the model with structural change (row 6) and in the model 
without (row 7). The null hypothesis in the model with structural change is: 
 =+ iiH 100 : or 1210 :  =+ iiH or 3430 :  =+ iiH , and:  =iH 00 :
or 110 :  =iH or 330 :  =iH in the model without structural change. It is 
rejected in both models. 
Therefore, this seems to confirm the two initial hypotheses described at the 
start of this paper: from 1992 on, coinciding with the change in European fiscal 
rules16, there is a change in the effects of both the output gap and debt on 
discretionary fiscal measures; furthermore, these effects are different for each 
EMU country. 
 
16 The fact of this coincidence does not imply that the new rules are the only explanation for the 
different behaviour observed in the fiscal authorities. This institutional change probably 
encouraged more budgetary discipline in Europe, reducing the weight of the public sector, which 
has a broader territorial dimension. 
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4.2. Diagnosis of the estimated model:
The evidence derived from the above statistical tests has led us to finally 
select a model with structural change in which each country’s fiscal policy 
coefficients can be different, but which also considers the interrelation between 
each of the national equations (simultaneous estimation). 
To diagnose our final estimation, we now analyse the existence of 
autocorrelation in the residuals, their normality and goodness of fit with the 
original series. As Table 6 shows, the p-values of the Ljung-Box and Breusch-
Godfrey tests only show slight evidence of autocorrelation for 1, 2 and 5 lags in 
some cases, whereas the Jarque Bera test confirms the normality of the residuals. 
Finally, we have also calculated the values of the goodness of fit 
measurements which would have been obtained working individually with each 
regression and, as we can see, they are lower than that obtained with the global 
system, which is very high. There is high variability in the fit of each country 
although, except for Portugal, Holland and Austria, the R2 is relatively high. 
 
Insert Table 6 here 
 
5. Interpretation of the results:
Returning to the values of the estimated fiscal policy rule coefficients for 
each country and for the EMU as a whole, we can analyse the results of the 
estimation in more detail. We have centred our analysis on four principal issues:
(i) the stabilising role of discretionary fiscal policy, as given by the effect of the 
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output gap on discretionary decisions, (ii) the effect on these discretionary 
decisions of the aim of guaranteeing the sustainability of public finance, (iii) the 
consequences of adopting the new fiscal policy normative framework (Maastricht 
Treaty and, later, the Stability and Growth Pact) on the two types of behaviour, 
and (iv) the differences in the coefficients estimated for each country. Following 
are the results of the joint analysis of these four issues: 
 
1. Before application of the Maastricht Treaty, most EMU countries were 
characterised by a procyclical discretionary fiscal policy, as can be seen in 
the negative sign of the S1i parameter (Table 4 and Graph 2). The only 
exceptions are Finland and Ireland, whereas the countries in which the 
negative value of the coefficient is greatest are Greece, Germany, Italy, 
France and Holland. 
Insert Graph 2 here 
 
Indeed, the activity, deficit and debt data shows that in an initial 
phase, from 1984 to 1987, the output gap was negative and contractive 
discretionary fiscal policies were, nonetheless, applied (there was an 
increase in the adjusted primary balance in the period, as seen on Graph 3). 
This behaviour can be justified by the difficult situation of public finances 
in early eighties, reducing the scope for using fiscal policy as a way of 
stabilising the economy. 
On the other hand, from 1988 to 1991 the European economies 
experienced an expansive phase, which favoured reduction of the deficit 
during the period. But this reduction occurred as a result of the application 
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of automatic stabilisers, since the discretionary fiscal policy was 
expansive. This can be seen in Graph 3. As you can observe, the output 
gap increased and the cyclical component of fiscal policy (the effect 
derived from the automatic stabilisers) therefore generated an 
improvement in the total budgetary balance. However, since the adjusted 
balance was diminishing (procyclical) the net effect was only a slight 
improvement in deficit figures. 
Insert Graph 3 here 
 
2. From 1992 on, most countries have experienced a important change in 
their discretionary fiscal policy; although most of the parameters continue 
to be negative (procyclical), their absolute values have decreased. We can 
therefore confirm the result obtained by Galí and Perotti (2003) that 
discretionary fiscal policy since 1992 has not been more, but less, 
procyclical. Furthermore, as Graph 2 shows, this change is greatest in 
precisely those countries in which procyclical behaviour had been more 
evident up to 1992: Germany, Greece and Italy. On the other hand, the 
discretionary fiscal policy of Finland remains anti-cyclical. 
Here again, however, there are two exceptions. In Belgium and 
Ireland the change in this coefficient was in the other direction, with its 
negative value increasing in the former and a positive value becoming 
negative in the latter. 
From 1994 to 1997, the euro-zone economies experienced, in 
average, a period of negative output gaps in which, nonetheless, restrictive 
discretionary fiscal measures were applied. This is probably justified by 
Page 22 of 36
Editorial Office, Dept of Economics, Warwick University, Coventry CV4 7AL, UK
Submitted Manuscript
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
For Peer Review
23
the budgetary adjustments required in most European countries to comply 
with the nominal convergence criteria established in the Stability and 
Growth Pact. Likewise, the high value of the debt-GDP ratio was also 
significant17, with the sustainability of public finance objective given 
priority over stabilisation of the economy, and leaving the latter to the 
automatic stabilisers. Also, as occurred in the previous expansionary 
phase, the recovery of growth rates in the late 90’s again gave rise to less 
strict discretionary fiscal policies. 
But, finally, if we consider the deceleration period starting in 2001, 
European countries have reduced the cyclically adjusted primary balance. 
In other words, unlike the two restrictive phases considered so far (early 
eighties and early nineties), anti-cyclical policies were applied on this 
occasion, as shown by the positive ratio between the change in the CABB 
and the change in the OG in the 2001-2005 period. As Graph 4 shows, this 
ratio is only negative – procyclical – in Austria, Spain and, particularly, 
Greece. 
This change in fiscal policy was probably enabled by the improved 
budgetary situation of European countries, which had more room to 
manoeuvre in 2001 than at the start of the two previous periods of 
deceleration. To a large extent, this results from the budgetary discipline 
imposed by the fiscal rules. It is also true, however, that these 
expansionary policies were applied even though they meant that six 
countries failed to comply with the SGP in some of these years, leading to 
 
17 The highest in the period analysed. 
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it being reformed in 2005 in order to increase its flexibility so that it could 
accommodate, for instance, unfavourable cyclical situations. 
Insert Graph 4 here 
 
3. In most countries, both before and after application of the Maastricht 
Treaty, public debt levels helped to generate positive adjusted primary 
balances. These coefficients are shown on Graph 5, and the only 
exceptions are Austria, Belgium and Holland (before 1992) and Germany 
after 1992. 
On the other hand, it is important to note that the change towards a 
more anti-cyclical discretionary fiscal policy did not represent an 
important change in reaction to debt in most European countries. This 
result is consistent with that obtained by Galí and Perotti (2003). 
 
Insert Graph 5 here 
 
4. From the estimated rule, a test can also be applied to weight the long-term 
sustainability of public finance18. The sufficient condition to guarantee 
solvency is for the estimation of the parameter representing the effect of 
the debt-GDP ratio on the adjusted primary balance (S3i before application 
of the Maastricht Treaty and S3i+ S4i, afterwards) to be positive. As Table 3 
and Graph 6 shows, this condition is met in most cases so that, except for 
Belgium19, the public finance of EMU countries is sustainable after 
application of the Maastricht Treaty.
18 See Bohn (1998) and Ballabriga and Martínez-Mongay (2005). 
19However, since this is only a sufficient condition, we cannot confirm with this test that it is 
unsustainable in Belgium. 
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5. With regards to the role established by the Stability and Growth Pact for 
discretionary measures and automatic stabilisers in the fiscal policy 
stabilising function20, we can affirm the following. During its first few 
years of application, the need to adapt to stricter budgetary discipline 
requirements led to discretionary fiscal measures partly compensating for 
the effect induced by automatic stabilisers. However, in more recent years, 
economic stagnation and previous fiscal adjustment led the fiscal 
authorities to adopt expansive discretionary measures to stabilise their 
economies, failing to strictly comply with the Pact’s philosophy, with 
some countries even failing to comply with the Pact itself. However, as we 
saw in the previous point, a small adjustment (positive) to the adjusted 
primary balance in response to accumulated debt is sufficient for public 
accounts to be sustainable, so SGP requirements would appear to be too 
strict, and the introduction of greater flexibility in the 2005 reform would 
be justified. 
 
Finally, by introducing the cyclically adjusted primary balance delayed one 
period as one of the regressors of the fiscal policy rule, we have estimated a 
dynamic model. One of the most significant features of these models is that they 
 
20The SGP does not literally establish that discretionary measures cannot be applied to stabilise the 
economy, but it is implicit in its philosophy when it states that governments must maintain 
equilibrium or a superavit position in the medium term. This approach is defended, for example, in 
European Central Bank (2004), and in relation to the relative role of discretionary measures and 
automatic stabilisers, Buti and Van der Noord (2004) say that: “While the potential usefulness of 
fiscal stabilisation is being re-considered, the “heritage" of the debate in the 1980s casts a strong 
scepticism over the use of discretionary fiscal action to fine tune the economy. (...) The use of 
discretionary fiscal policy for stabilising purposes should be confined only to exceptional 
situations”. 
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enable us to distinguish between the short and long-term response of the 
dependent variable to variations in one of the explanatory variables. 
The short-term effects are given by the coefficients estimated in the model, 
which we have analysed in the above section. With regards to the long-term 
effects, they are obtained by considering that the impact of each explanatory 
variable on discretionary fiscal policy at time t is not only due to the 
contemporary value of the variable (at time t) but also to the effect of the 
evolution of the same variable in previous periods (t-1, t-2…). This long-term 
effect can be identified in the response functions to the output gap and debt level, 
also considering the possible changes to the effects of the two variables from 1992 
on. 
Table 7 shows the short-term effects of the output gap and debt (before 
Maastricht, 81i, 83i and after Maastricht, 81i+82i, 83i+84i, respectively), and the 
accumulated effects from their impact21. The long-term effect is evidently greater, 
so we should consider that the response of the authorities is more active than 
initially assumed given the short-term expect, since the 85i parameter is always 
positive. Our conclusions concerning the procyclical or anticyclical nature of 
discretionary fiscal action, however, remain unaltered. 
Insert Table 7 here 
 
21These effects will be significantly different from zero whenever the coefficients are. Since the 
accumulated effect is Sji/(1- S5i), when the test is performed, the null hypothesis (the estimated 
coefficient is zero) will only be accepted when the same hypothesis, but considered with the 
numerator coefficient, is not rejected. 
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6. Conclusions:
In this paper, we have used a SURE model to simultaneously estimate the 
rule characterising the behaviour of the fiscal authorities in each EMU country in 
the 1983-2005 period. This estimation procedure has enabled us to identify the 
impact of common factors such as the new fiscal framework, but also to obtain the 
differences in the national values of the coefficients of the rule, contemplating 
other aspects (institutional, political or economic) specific to each country. In our 
opinion, this is an important contribution to the empirical literature related to 
fiscal policy in the EMU. 
Our estimated fiscal policy rule pays special attention to the reaction of the 
discretionary component of fiscal policy versus variations in the economy’s 
cyclical conditions – measured by the output gap- and in the level of public debt. 
We also analyse whether there was a change in this reaction after the Maastricht 
Treaty came into force in 1992. 
In this respect, one of the most solid results obtained from the estimation is 
that there is clear evidence of a structural break after the introduction of a new 
fiscal framework. This change is seen in a reduction in the procyclical nature of 
previous fiscal policies, even though there was no significant reduction in the 
authorities’ reactions to increased debt in the form of increases in the cyclically 
adjusted primary balance. On the other hand, this reaction appears to be sufficient 
to guarantee the long-term sustainability of public debt. 
These results support those previously obtained in the literature and, in 
particular, are generally consistent with those obtained by Galí and Perotti (2003), 
our reference for this paper. However, we have also obtained clear evidence in 
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favour of the need to distinguish between the fiscal rules for each country, 
estimating them with a SURE model to collect all the cross correlations, because 
all our tests have rejected the hypothesis of equality in the national coefficients, a 
constraint which was applied to prior studies. There is, for example, a large 
difference between Finland – the only country in which discretionary policy was 
clearly anti-cyclical during the two periods considered – and Greece – the country 
with the clearest procyclical activity in both periods. We believe that this result 
shows a need to continue our analysis with a specific study of the national factors 
behind these differences. 
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Tables and Graphs:
TABLE 1: REGRESSION COEFFICIENTES FOR EACH COUNTRY:
i0 : Constant before 1992. 
ii 10  + : Constant from 1992 on.   
i1 : Effect of economic evolution on the discretionary nature of fiscal policy 
before 1992. For each percentage point that the output gap changes, a 
structural primary balance of i1 percentage points is generated in the same 
period. 
ii 21  + : Effect of economic evolution on the discretionary nature of fiscal 
policy from 1992 on. For each percentage point that the output gap changes, a 
structural primary balance of ii 21  + percentage points is generated in the 
same period. 
i3 : Effect that the level of debt in the previous period has on the 
discretionary nature of fiscal policy before 1992. For each percentage point of 
debt in the previous period, a structural primary balance of i3 percentage 
points is generated in the same period. 
ii 43  + : Effect that the level of debt in the previous period has on the 
discretionary nature of fiscal policy from 1992 on. For each percentage point 
of debt accumulated up to the previous period, a structural primary balance of 
ii 43  + percentage points is generated in the same period. 
i5 : It represents the inertia of the structural primary balance, determining 
how the past of the dependent variable influences its future evolution. 
TABLE 2: HETEROSCEDASTICITY TEST BETWEEN GROUPS AND 
CROSS-SECTION CORRELATION:
STATISTIC* P-VALUE 
( ) 3,1629log'log)( =













= T
Tn
eeTnLR 0.0000 
*The asymptotic distribution is 2 with ( ) 1
2
1

+ nn
degrees of freedom. 
Source: the authors, from the results of the estimations. 
Page 30 of 36
Editorial Office, Dept of Economics, Warwick University, Coventry CV4 7AL, UK
Submitted Manuscript
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
For Peer Review
31
TABLE 3: CONTEMPORANEOUS RESIDUAL CORRELATIONS 
ESTIMATED BY GLS:
AU BE FI FR GE GR IR IT HO PO SP 
AU 1.0000 0.0811 -0.0222 0.1337 0.1667 -0.1961 -0.1543 0.4784 -0.2417 0.1671 0.1657 
BE 0.0811 1.0000 -0.0165 0.3240 -0.0011 -0.0943 0.0043 -0.1399 -0.2390 -0.3701 -0.0575
FI -0.0222 -0.0165 1.0000 -0.1607 0.3831 0.2619 0.0392 0.1449 -0.0103 -0.0785 -0.6381
FR 0.1337 0.3240 -0.1607 1.0000 0.3587 0.4203 0.2852 0.0401 0.2764 -0.3333 0.4673 
GE 0.1667 -0.0011 0.3831 0.3587 1.0000 0.4855 0.5886 0.3026 0.3142 -0.0198 -0.1539
GR -0.1961 -0.0943 0.2619 0.4203 0.4855 1.0000 0.4273 -0.2819 0.3522 -0.1859 0.1422 
IR -0.543 0.0043 0.0392 0.2852 0.5886 0.4273 1.0000 0.2056 0.4808 0.1493 -0.0221
IT 0.4784 -0.1399 0.1449 0.0401 0.3026 -0.2819 0.2056 1.0000 -0.2127 0.6027 0.0342 
HO -0.2417 -0.2390 -0.0103 0.2764 0.3142 0.3522 0.4808 -0.2127 1.0000 -0.5234 -0.1187
PO 0.1671 -0.3701 -0.0785 -0.3333 -0.0198 -0.1859 0.1493 0.6027 -0.5234 1.0000 0.2139 
SP 0.1657 -0.0575 -0.6381 0.4673 -0.1539 0.1422 -0.0221 0.0342 -0.1187 0.2139 1.0000 
Source: the authors, from the results of the estimations. 
 
TABLE 4: ESTIMATION OF DISCRETIONARY FISCAL POLICY IN EMU-
11:
CONSTANT OUTPUT GAP DEBT CABB-1
TOTAL AFTER 
MAASTRICHT COUNTRY 
0 1 1 2 3 4 5 0+1 1+2 3+4
3.44 -12.58 -0.04 0.04 -0.06 0.21 0.47 -9.14 0.00 0.14 AUSTRIA 
(0.75) (-2.17) (-0.18) (0.13) (-0.79) (2.13) (2.90) (-2.56) (-0.02) (2.64) 
12.36 -14.09 -0.03 -0.50 -0.10 0.11 0.83 -1.73 -0.52 0.02 BELGIUM 
(1.94) (-1.96) (-0.18) (-2.26) (-1.78) (2.00) (7.90) (-1.00) (-3.33) (1.55) 
-10.23 8.70 0.21 0.07 0.61 -0.53 0.34 -1.54 0.27 0.08 FINLAND 
(-1.37) (1.15) (1.28) (0.35) (1.48) (-1.28) (1.78) (-0.70) (2.07) (2.21) 
-1.07 -1.78 -0.26 -0.07 0.02 0.01 0.59 -2.84 -0.33 0.04 FRANCE 
(-0.19) (-0.33) (-1.77) (-0.32) (0.17) (0.10) (4.42) (-2.73) (-2.19) (2.19) 
-42.91 43.85 -0.80 0.36 1.05 -1.07 0.54 0.94 -0.44 -0.02 GERMANY 
(-3.37) (3.43) (-6.05) (1.91) (3.38) (-3.43) (5.05) (0.83) (-3.48) (-0.93)
-8.88 5.75 -1.46 0.55 0.09 -0.06 0.27 -3.13 -0.91 0.03 GREECE 
(-4.82) (1.20) (-4.75) (1.42) (3.07) (-1.31) (2.17) (-0.69) (-3.83) (0.79) 
-15.87 16.75 0.21 -0.48 0.17 -0.16 0.42 0.88 -0.27 0.01 IRELAND 
(-3.16) (3.33) (0.94) (-1.95) (3.30) (-3.12) (2.66) (0.58) (-1.62) (0.26) 
-17.90 9.47 -0.76 0.36 0.18 -0.10 0.58 -8.43 -0.40 0.08 ITALY 
(-3.49) (1.07) (-2.61) (1.10) (3.34) (-1.21) (2.95) (-1.09) (-2.72) (1.15) 
10.02 -11.24 -0.32 0.14 -0.12 0.15 0.42 -1.22 -0.18 0.03 HOLLAND 
(0.65) (-0.72) (-1.10) (0.38) (-0.66) (0.81) (2.49) (-0.65) (-0.98) (1.23) 
-0.68 -0.95 -0.12 0.09 0.03 0.00 0.34 -1.63 -0.03 0.03 PORTUGAL
(-0.11) (-0.13) (-1.43) (0.58) (0.24) (0.02) (2.05) (-0.50) (-0.26) (0.54) 
-4.51 4.96 -0.20 0.21 0.09 -0.09 0.74 0.45 0.01 0.00 SPAIN 
(-1.38) (1.39) (-1.79) (1.13) (1.26) (-1.14) (6.13) (0.31) (0.07) (0.14) 
-0.72 0.09 -0.15 -0.01 0.01 0.00 0.82 -0.63 -0.17 0.01 EMU 
(-3.24) (0.26) (-5.50) (-0.32) (4.11) (0.38) (31.09) (-2.61) (-4.68) (4.25) 
The brackets contain the value of the t-statistic of the parameter significance test. 
Source: the authors, from the results of the estimations. 
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TABLE 5: EVIDENCE OF A STRUCTURAL CHANGE FROM 1992 ON:
No. TEST MODEL 1 2 4
1 CHOW TEST 0.02348 
INFORMATION CRITERIA 
MODEL 
WITH 
BREAK 
MODEL 
WITHOUT 
BREAK 
- AIC -172.638 -113.61 
2
- SC -171.528 -112.976 
3 R2 (McElroy) 0.925 
4 STRUCTURAL CHANGE BY PARAMETER 4.24E-06 6.41E-02 8.16E-06 
5 EQUAL MAASTRICHT EFFECT ACROSS COUNTRIES 2.79E-06 4.72E-02 4.40E-06 
6 EQUAL PARAMETERS ACROSS COUNTRIES (WITH STRUCTURAL CHANGE) 3.53E-07 5.19E-11 3.06E-06 
7 EQUAL PARAMETERS ACROSS COUNTRIES (WITHOUT STRUCTURAL CHANGE) 0.000000 0.,000000 1.78E-15 
The information provided about test results refers to  p-value. 
Source: the authors, from the results of the estimations. 
 
TABLE 6: MODEL DIAGNOSIS STATISTICS:
AUTOCORRELATION* NORMALITY COUNTRY
1 lag 2 lags 5 lags 
R2 
Jarque Bera 
0.93 0.65 0.80 Austria 
0.51 0.08 0.02 
0.517 0.84 
0.50 0.83 0.75 Belgium 
0.15 0.07 0.17 
0.908 0.38 
0.74 1.00 0.77 Finland 
0.05 0.12 0.08 
0.686 0.67 
0.81 0.77 0.47 France 
0.04 0.09 0.12 
0.806 0.51 
0.52 0.99 0.56 Germany 
0.10 0.07 0.02 
0.768 0.57 
0.89 0.85 0.55 Greece 
0.04 0.11 0.15 
0.897 0.65 
0.83 0.73 0.65 Ireland 
0.04 0.05 0.04 
0.763 0.93 
0.91 1.00 0.49 Italy 
0.10 0.23 0.38 
0.924 0.41 
0.73 0.48 0.58 Holland 
0.04 0.03 0.00 
0.598 0.62 
0.74 0.73 0.79 Portugal 
0.27 0.13 0.22 
0.360 0.96 
0.50 0.67 0.59 Spain 
0.06 0.13 0.03 
0.864 0.81 
Global 0.925 
*For each country, the first row corresponds to the Ljung-Box Q test and the second to the 
Breusch-Godfrey test. 
The information provided about the test results refers to the p-value. 
Source: the authors, from the results of the estimations. 
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TABLE 7: SHORT-TERM AND LONG-TERM EFFECTS OF OUTPUT 
GAP AND DEBT BEFORE AND AFTER  MAASTRICHT TREATY.
Before Maastricht After Maastricht 
Country 
1
Accumulated 
response 3
Accumulated 
response 1+2
Accumulated 
response 3+4
Accumulated 
response 
Austria -0,039 -0,075 -0,064 -0,122 -0,003 -0,007 0,142 0,270 
Belgium -0,028 -0,161 -0,095 -0,545 -0,524 -3,003 0,019 0,107 
Finland 0,206 0,311 0,608 0,916 0,273 0,412 0,078 0,118 
France -0,262 -0,637 0,025 0,060 -0,335 -0,814 0,039 0,095 
Germany -0,801 -1,748 1,049 2,291 -0,445 -0,971 -0,018 -0,039 
Greece -1,458 -1,998 0,094 0,128 -0,905 -1,241 0,030 0,040 
Ireland 0,207 0,359 0,168 0,291 -0,269 -0,466 0,007 0,012 
Italy -0,757 -1,806 0,181 0,431 -0,399 -0,952 0,077 0,184 
Holland -0,320 -0,550 -0,125 -0,215 -0,177 -0,305 0,030 0,051 
Portugal -0,118 -0,179 0,026 0,040 -0,032 -0,049 0,028 0,043 
Spain -0,199 -0,764 0,089 0,342 0,012 0,045 0,003 0,013 
Euro 
area -0,151 -0,834 0,011 0,061 -0,165 -0,912 0,012 0,066 
Source: the authors, from the results of the estimations. 
 
GRAPH 1: AUTOCORRELATION FUNCTION OF THE RESIDUALS 
ESTIMATED BY GLS: 
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Source: the authors, from the results of the estimations. 
 
GRAPH 2: ESTIMATED COEFFICIENTS FOR THE OG: 
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Source: the authors, from the results of the estimations. 
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GRAPH 3: FISCAL POLICY IN EMU, 1984-2005. 
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Source: OECD Economic Outlook. 
 
GRAPH 4: CHANGE IN CABB/CHANGE IN OG, 2005-2000
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GRAPH 5: ESTIMATED COEFFICIENTS FOR THE PUBLIC DEBT: 
-0,200
0,000
0,200
0,400
0,600
0,800
1,000
1,200
A
us
tri
a
B
el
gi
um
Fi
nl
an
d
Fr
an
ce
G
er
m
an
y
G
re
ec
e
Ire
la
nd Ita
ly
N
et
he
rla
nd
s
P
or
tu
ga
l
S
pa
in
E
ur
o
ar
ea
Before 1992 After 1992
Source: the authors, from the results of the estimations. 
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